Irish Broad Front Movement

Bernadette McAliskey Interview

Socialist Action
April 1998

Interviewer Gerry Foley

Socialist Action: What were the political implications of British home secretary Jack Straw's decision to release Roisin finally after 16 months imprisonment? Did this action have any meaning within the Irish peace process or the negotiations between the British govenrment and Sinn Fein?

Bernadette Devlin McAliskey: Her release was a victory for a very broad based human rights campaign rather than coming in the context of political negotiations. The government were responding to a number of pressures. They had a very weak case. There was the international scope of the campaign for Roisin's release, and then there were the damage that was obviously being done to her. So, finally the government had no other option but to release her.

I don't think Roisin's release had any impact on the peace process. It took place outside of it. But it would have had an impact on the other hand if she had actually been extradicted, because it would have shown that there were no human rights the British government respected, so there would have been no possibility of negotiating anything better.

Roisin's release does have a bearing on broader issues. The basic problems that allowed her to be imprisoned and treated as she was remain to be addressed. The British government avoided these questions by hiding behind the medical evidence about Roisin's condition, claiming that they were releasing her on humanitarian grounds. Therefore, her release does not challenge the European Extradition Treaty under which she was held, the Germans's right to use the European Extradition Treaty [since they exempt their own citizens from it], or police abuse. But the lessons of Roisin's case are being learnt and we are continuing to fight on these issues.

SA: So, where does the campaign go from here.

BDM: I do not think that you can carry a single issue campaign beyond its natural conclusion. There were many forces that came together in this campaign for specific reasons. Many young women worked in the campaign because they became emotionally involved, because Roisin was young and pregnant, because of the government's cruelty to her. Some became involved in the case as a human rights issue, others as an Irish issue, others as a prisoners' issue. There were many different layers. I hope that the various components of the campaign will continue to fight on these issues in different ways amd be reinforced by the victory on Roisin's case.

Roisin's case has seriously damaged the credibility of the Castlereagh interrogation center. The Home Office itself acknowledged that the source of the trauma Roisin was suffering was her seven days in Castlereagh. And there is absolutely no official record of what happened to her there. She is by no means the first person to have been traumatized at Castlereagh. There have been many. Roisin has been open and honest about the effects her treatment there had on her. Hopefully, this will encourage others to come forward and tell about their own experiences.

As regards the Germans, they have to ask how their police became involved in this case. In the United States, people might recognize that the same legal protections are being wiped out under the cover of emotional issues such as terrorism or drugs. A whole number of laws are being passed that present the same dangers as the European Extradition treaty. Other campaigns have to be built on these issues.

SA: The Roisin case has helped to expose the nature of British repression in Northern Ireland by the very fact that she was not involved in IRA activity or any political activity at all. She was arrested simply as part of a campaign of intimidation against a whole community. Do you think that her case has paved the way for a campaign for amnesty for all the victims of British repression in Northern Ireland?

BDM: The demand for release of the prisoners is growing. But the demand for amnesty has not yet been articulated politically. The Loyalists have actually put a position on the prisoners more clearly than the Republicans so far. They have said that they are having no part of a settlement that does not only include the prisoners but specify the mechanism of their release. The Republicans include the prisoners in their agenda but they have not articulated any general demands.

There is no indication that the British are going to recognize the prisoners as prisoners of war or even political prisoners. I myself think that it is a mistake to deal with the prisoner issue simply by fighting on a case by case basis or on the basis of partial concessions, such as compassionate leave or transfer to prisoners in Ireland. Just fighting the cases individually does not provide a political basis for negotiating the release of all the prisoners.

SA: What do you mean by 'all the prisoners'? Some people, including the British, want to equate Republican and Loyalist prisoners. But the Republican prisoners are victims of the system. The Loyalists are defending that system, only by illegal and often atrocious means.

BDM: The distinction between Loyalist and Republican prisoners has been allowed to be clouded. This is a result of putting everything in the context of 'we are all victims.' Nonetheless, I do not oppose release of the Loyalist prisoners. It is just the Republican prisoners and the Loyalist prisoners are different issues. Anyway, the outlook is for the prisoners coming out in dribs and drabs.I imagine that any half-way intelligent person in the government would know that shortly after any settlement the number of prisoners is going to be reduced. In the South, there have been releases. Now, most of the political prisoners in the South have been transferred there from Britain. They are likely to be released if there is a settlement. Many long termers will soon be released.

There may be some new prisoners going in from the groups that have not declared ceasefires. They will be treated differently, and that could be the beginning of divisions. But there would not be many new prisoners. The danger is that some of the prisoners will only be coming out when it is time to start all over again. Remember that many of the prisoners from the last IRA campaign at the end of the 1950s did not get out before the mid-1960s.

SA: What do you think the possibilities are for starting up new mass protest movements?

BDM: The conditions are very adverse to building mass movements at the moment. There are still very deep illusions among the Sinn Fein rank and file that their leadership can pull a deal or has some strategy that can lead to a reasonable settlement. Unless the Republicans start to see things differently, it will be difficult to get anything going without them. They are less confident about the table these days but they are not yet convinced that the table will not yield something they can accept.

There is activity by Republican sponsored groups such as Saoirse and Cearta. The leadership supports activity only up to a certain level, and that means that mass action will remain secondary to the negotiating table.

SA: What do you think about the proposed referendum on a settlement planned for May?

BDM: The best possibility for building a mass movement at the moment is probably the question of dropping articles 2 and 3 from the Irish constitution [these articles claim sovereignty over the whole of Ireland. The general conception put forward of a settlement is that in return for the British recognizing some sort of all Ireland dimension and cross-border boards, the Dublin government will drop the claim to all-Ireland sovereignty inscribed in its constitution]. There is growing concern in the South that the Irish state could drop these articles, while the referendum would fail in the North.

Actually, there will be two referendums, since there are two jurisdictions. It does not make any sense to say that there is one, any more than there could be one referendum in both the United States and Canada. Even in Fianna Fail [traditionally the more nationalist of the two main bourgeois parties] people are worried that the referendum in the South could lead to undermining the constitution. But they are more aroused by constitutionalist issues than Republican ones.

SA: Do you think the referendums will actually be held? There has been a lot of moaning and groaning in the capitalist press about the difficulty of putting together the combination needed to pass them, for example a de facto alliance between the constitutionalist nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Ulster Unionist Party [the mainstream Unionists].

BDM: I was talking to a Loyalist the other day who is involved in the negotiations and he expected the referenda to be held. But he could not say what the actual question will be. That is, there is agreement on holding the referenda but not on the question. There is agreement but no one knows for what. So, you could get a majority not by de facto alliances but simply by parallel voting, different parties voting 'yes' for different reasons.

Anyway, they have to come up with some settlement before the Orange marching season begins again. [Nationalist protests against Orange marches in nationalist neighborhoods led to a massive mobilization last summer.]

SA: Has there been a decline in the level of repression?

BDM: Yes, overall, in the sense that you do not see so many police and army on the streets. But police and military forces are still being concentrated in pockets. There has been a massive influx of police and army into my area in the last 48 hours. So, people are wondering if they know that something is going to happen here. But it is not very clear. At the same time, the belligence of the local police forces has increased. The British troops are more relaxed, because they think a settlement is coming. But the local police alternate between triumphalism and fear that something may be given away that will undermine the system they defend. Many of them are probably members of the Protestant paramilitaries. Because of the confusion, there is less central control. The repression is becoming more personal, more arbitrary, less systematic, dictated more by internal political considerations than by central security concerns.

SA: What about the polls that show that 51 percent of Sinn Fein voters will accept a settlement involving the continuation of partition?

BDM: I think they mean what they say. A lot of Sinn Fein's new vote comes from people who simply did not see ay reason for voting before. They had not taken an interest in day-to-day nationalist politics and still less in the war. But the prospect of a political settlement attracted them. They voted for Sinn Fein for peace, and because it has a more dynamic and professional delivery than the SDLP but not because of any Republican convictions. Pressure from them could lead Sinn Fein further than it wants to go.

The settlement will lead to elections for a new assembly to govern the North. [Sinn Fein president] Gerry Adams has said that his party will contest the Assembly elections but not sit in a partitionist body. However, Sinn Fein's new voters are hardly likely to understand that position.

Moreover, in the U.S., a lot of Sinn Fein's friends are friends of its peace settlement. Their support therefore propels Sinn Fein toward negotiating a settlement. But it is not clear what the Hibernian Alliance - that is, this alliance that goes from Sinn Fein to the Irish government, to the SDLP and right into the Democratic Party in the United States - thinks constitutes a settlement. ['Hibernian' in irish politics means conservative nationalist, more rights for Catholics but not real Irish independence.]

In the last analysis, therefore, Sinn Fein's new American friends may really be friends of the Alliance but not of Sinn Fein as such. Participation in the new Northern Ireland Assembly is going to be hard for Sinn Fein, not for the rest of the Alliance. But if the SDLP and the Irish government agree, what can Sinn Fein do? Sinn Fein is also going to come under extreme pressure from the U.S.

SA: I thought that Sinn Fein had dropped its rule against participating in partitionist parliaments when it decided to drop abstaining from the Southern Parliament back in the 1980s.

BDM: That does not apply to British jurisdiction parliaments. They are clear about that. The question for them is whether the settlement includes sufficient cross-border institutions for them to say that the new Assembly will not be a partitionist body. They really do not have much option but to contest the elections, and then it will be hard not to participate in the Assembly itself. Sinn Fein sits in local councils and denounces the Unionists for not working with them.

How then can they do that and not sit in the parliament that themselves have negotiated? Sitting in the Asembly may cause them problems with their old voters. But these people have no place to go. Sinn Fein's base won't like the settlement but they will accept it.

The so-called peace process is really a pacification process. And the operation is proceeding according to its own logic. Nonetheless, it could still be blown up by Unionist belligerence or a change of mind by the Sinn Fein leadership, when they realize how little they are getting and where the process is leading. But then Sinn Fein would have to change its whole strategy. I think that the present illusions about the peace process will have to dissipate before any new movement is possible.

SA: So, what do you think can be done now?

BDM: Two things. We have to look for opportunities to mobilize people on specific issues, even limited ones. We also try to engage political discussion, encourage people to examine the basic realities of the relationship between Ireland and England. We need analysis and new thinking. It has been a problem in the Irish movement for some time that there has been little study of history or political discussion. That has to be overcome. That is the first step that has to be taken before we can start to move forward again.


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